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At the Fiftieth Anniversary Convocation, May 8,1953, Andrew J. Dallstream '17, President of the Chicago Bar Asso­
ciation, extended the greetings of the Chicago, the Illinois State, and the American Bar associations to The University
of Chicago Law School.
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Chancellor Lawrence A. Kimpton, with the honorary degree candidates. Left to right: The Honorable Felix Frank­
furter, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States; Laird Bell, Chairman, Board of Trustees, The Univer­
lity of Chicago; Arthur Linton Corbin, Professor of Law Emeritus, Law School, Yale Uniucrsity; The Honorable
Jerome N. Frank, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; The Honorable Thomas Walter Swan, Pre­
siding Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; The Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
FELIX FRANKFURTER
Professor of Law, pioneer in the study and teaching
of administrative law, Justice of the United States Su­
preme Court, in recognition of his devotion to scholar­
ship and to the principles of the judicial process.
LAIRD BELL
Distinguished alumnus, lawyer, and citizen, who has
made of the practice of law a career of public service
and who, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of this
University, has encouraged us to believe that a univer­
sity, to be great, must adhere to principle and not be
afraid of freedom.
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN
Dedicated and gifted teacher and scholar, whose in­
sight and painstaking analyses have contributed greatly
to our understanding of contract law and its relation to
changing social mores.
JEROME N. FRANK
Distinguished alumnus, lawyer, commissioner, judge,
philosopher, and teacher, for the ability, the courage,
and the enthusiasm with which he has sought, by the
orderly processes of law, to make a better world.
THOMAS WALTER SWAN
Outstanding lawyer and educator in the law, presiding
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in recognition of his craftsmanship and
scholarship in the noblest tradition of our common law.
ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT
Lawyer, educator, and judge, pioneer in the field of
judicial administration, in recognition of his scholarly
and able work for the improvement of the administra­
tion of justice.
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Left to right: Justice Felix frankfurter, Chancellor Law­
rence A. Kimpton, and Mr. Laird Bell '07.
Left to right: Andrew J. Dallstream '17, president af
the Chicago Bar Association; Dean Wesley A. Stur­
ges of the Law School, Yale University, who gave the
Convocation Address; and The Honorable Walter V.
Schaefer, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Illinois, who
brought the greetings of the judiciary to The Law School .
...
Left to right: Judge Thomas W. Swan, Chancellor
Kimpton, and Judge Jerome N. Frank '12.
Dean Sturges addressing the Fiftieth Anniversary Con­
vocation. His subject was "Fifty Years of Legal Educa­
tion."
Dean Edward H. Levi at the lectern presented the hon­
orary-degree candidates to Chancellor Kimpton. Shown
above is Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was escorted
by Wilber C. Katz, James Parker Hall Professor of
Law.
Laird Bell was escorted by Professor Sheldon Tefft
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Rockefeller Memorial Chapel was filled on the afternoon of May 8 for The Law School's Fiftieth Anniversary
Convocation. In addition to a large assemblage of alumni representing the fifty years of the School's history, the
bar associations, the learned societies, and the judiciary were represented. Legal education in the United States was
represented by delegates from the following schools: American University, Washington College of Law, Boston
College Law School, Catholic University of America, Chicago-Kent College of Law, College of William and Mary,
Columbia University, Drake University, Duke University, Emory University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Fordham University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, Howard University, Indiana University, John Mar­
shall Law School, Loyola University, Montana State University, New York University, Northwestern University, Ohio
State University, Southern Methodist University, Stanford University, St.John's University, Tulane University, Univer­
sity of Arizona, University of Arkansas, University of Colorado, University of Denver, University of Georgia, Uni­
versity of Illinois, University of Iowa, University of Kansas City, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville,
University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, University of Mississippi, University of Missouri, University of
North Carolina, University of North Dakota, University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania, University of
Pittsburgh, University of Puerto Rico, University of Santa Clara, University of Southern California, University
of Utah, University of Virginia, University of Washington, University of Wisconsin, Vanderbilt University, Wash­
burn University, Washington and Lee University, Washington University, Wayne University, Western Reserve
University, and Yale Law School.
University Trustee Frank L. Sulzberger closed the ranks
of the trustees preceding the honorary-degree candidates
in the procession from Ida Noyes Hall to Rockefeller
Memorial Chapel.
Mayor Martin H. Kennelly headed the procession of
representatives of the city, the state, and the judiciary.
In the procession were Judges George W. Bristow, Wil­
liam J. Campbell, Joseph E. Daily, Samuel B. Epstein,
Michael Feinberg, Hugo M. Friend, Harry B. Hershey,
Roger J. Kiley, John C. Lewe, Walter C. Lindley, Ralph
L. Maxwell, Sam Perry, Edwin A. Robson, Elmer. J.
Schnackenberg, Ulysses S. Schwartz, and H. Nathan
Swaim.
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Following the Convocation the guests of The Law School attended a reception
at the Quadrangle Club.
Nearly five hundred alumni and friends of The Law School filled Hutchinson
Commons for the banquet climaxing the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration.
Joseph, W. Bingham '04, Professor of Law Emeritus,
Stanford University, and a member of the first class
of The University of Chicago Law School, was the ban­
quet speaker.
Glen A. Lloyd '23, president of The Law School Alumni
Association, brought the greetings of the alumni to The
Law School. To his left are George Maurice Morris
'15, who introduced the speaker of the evening, and
Chancellor Lawrence A. Kimpton.
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The Parity of the Economic
Market Place
I
Absolute doctrines are always easier to state and per­
haps defend than doctrines which have to be limited.
The doctrine of complete lai.ssez faire, which is claimed
for the area of discussion, is not part of the main tradi­
tion of liberalism in the area of economic life. It is not
possible on this occasion to outline in detail the proper
division of labor between political and economic organi­
zation. A few preliminary observations directed to such
an outline is all that can be here provided.
1. There is, first of all, the field of taxation, which
is, in fact, the field of public expenditures the object of
which is redistribution of income. How far such political
activity can be carried without ultimately undermining
the competitive form of economic organization is in­
deed an open issue. But it can take a form which will
minimize such undermining. Ideally it should take
the form of transfers of money income between fami­
lies. How far this ideal form can be pushed I do not
know. It should further take a form which tends to
remove the necessity for redistribution, i.e., it should
emphasize the goal of greater equality in earning ca­
pacity, rather than greater equality in the distribution
of results.
The main point I wish to call attention to here is
the unnecessary increase of government activity which
derives from the implicit assumption that, whenever there
is a political decision to make certain expenditures by
families compulsory or to assure certain minimum
standards of consumption, the organization of the
resources involved must also be assigned to the state.
The test for the latter should always be whether or not
the necessary organization is of a type which can be
arranged on a competitive basis. A proper regard for
this criterion would, I believe, reduce significantly the
area of political decisions without in any way impairing
the equalitarian objectives. In fact, an incidental advan­
tage of this principle is that it would clarify the extent to
which actual expenditures do, in fact, foster equalitarian
objectives and the extent to whi.ch they reinforce the in­
equalities which already exist. The point can perhaps be
best illustrated with Mill's observations on the organiza­
tion of education, made, it is true, with the different
objective of preventing the growth of uniformi.ty of ideas:
If the government would make up its mind to require for
every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble
of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the
education where and how they pleased, and content itself
with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of
children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those
who have no one to pay them.'
1 J. S. Mill, On Liberty.
.Aaron Director, Professor of Economics in The Law
School, presented "The Parity of the Economic Mar­
ket Place" at the Fiftieth Anniversary Conference on
"Freedom and the Law."
2. Laissez faire has never been more than a slogan
in defense of the proposition that every extension of
state activity should be "examined under a presumption
of error." The main tradition of economic liberalism
has always assumed a well-established system of law
and order designed to harness self-interest to serve the
welfare of all. The institution of private property-at
least since Hume==has always been defended on this
ground. And wherever it seemed that this institution
might be modified without subverting the general frame­
work of a competitive society, the tradition has shown
a readiness-perhaps exaggerated-to modify this basic
institution. But the tradition goes much beyond this. It
has always assumed that there were some economic re­
sults which cannot be attained at all or attained only
in inappropriate amounts if left to the free market.
The tradition has always been hostile to private
monopolies whether contrived by enterprise or labor.
Inadequate attention to this problem in the earlier peri­
od is to be explained by the tacit assumption, which is
not without merit, that under neutral rules the market
would largely frustrate such contrivances. To the ex­
tent that this assumption was shown to be invalid, the
tradition has shown a readiness, although not matched
by achievement, to formulate positive rules which will
do so.
Where economic services can only be provided by
monopoly form of organization because of underlying
technical conditions, the liberal bias, in our own day
at least, is against private exploitation of such monopo­
lies. Fortunately the area does not appear to be yery
2 Cf. David Hume, An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,
Sec. III of "Justice."
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extensive. If it were, the conflict between economic free­
dom and economic efficiency would become significant.
The coercive character of monopoly is not altered by
transferring it to the state.
3. Reference should also be made to the recognition
that a suitable monetary framework cannot be provided
by competition and constitutes one of the requi.site
legal institutions.
4. Having noted these qualifications or "concessions,"
it is now in point to restate the "presumption of error
doctrine." Every qualification is made because of some
deficiency in the free-market type of organization. But
every deficiency is met by an extension of state activity.
It has been well said that "it is not possible to be con­
tinually taking steps towards socialism without one
day arriving at the goal.?" In this respect there is a
remarkable/similarity between the underlying basis for
complete .laissez faire in the market for ideas and the
market for economic goods and services. The absolute
doctrine of the first is defended even though it necessi­
tates the protection of speech which no reasonable man
wants or should want to see protected. But there is
great wisdom in Justice Douglas' eloquent observation
on the danger of encroaching interference:
The Court in this and in other cases places speech under
an expanding legislative control. Today a white man stands
convicted for protesting in unseemly language against our
decisions invalidating restrictive covenants. Tomorrow a
Negro will be haled before a court for denouncing lynch law
in heated terms. Farm laborers in the West who compete
with field hands drifting up from Mexico; whites who feel
the pressure of orientals; a minority which finds employ­
ment going to members of the dominant religious group-all
of these are caught in the mesh of today's decision."
II
The free market as a desirable method of organizing
the intellectual life of the community 'Yas urged long
before it was advocated as a desirable method of or­
ganizing its economic life. The advantage of free ex­
change of ideas was recognized before that of the vol­
untary exchange of goods and services in competitive
markets. The explanation lies perhaps in the greater
complexity of the theory of the market for goods and
services, which came only with the actual emergence
of a substantial amount of competition.
Moreover, freedom of speech and belief was advo­
cated long before the growth of democracy. Hume and
Smith, the leading theorists of the competitive system,
were not democrats. With Bentham and James Mill,
the argument for freedom merges with that for democ­
racy. And this in a peculiar manner. Leslie Stephen
tells us that liberty "means sometimes simply the dimi­
nution of the sphere of law and the power of the legis­
lators, or, again, the transference to subjects of the
3 Thomas Mackay (ed.), A Plea for Libel·ty (3d ed., 1894), p. XI
4 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 at 286.
power of legislating, and, therefore, not less control,
but control by self-made laws alone.?" Bentham and
James Mill argued for liberty in the second sense on
the ground of "responsibility to persons whose in­
terest, whose obvious and recognizable interest, accords
with the end in view-good government." And such
identity of interest is to be found in "nothing less than
the numerical majority.?" Bentham was not only a
great reformer of the law but also a vigorous advocate
of liberty in the sense of a diminution of the sphere
of law and the power of legislators. The argument for
this was the same as that for democracy-interest. "The
interest which a man takes in the affairs of another,
a member of the sovereignty for example in those of a
subject, is not likely to be so great as the interest which
either of them takes in his own: still less where that
other is a perfect stranger." To this Bentham added
the advantage of superior knowledge which is cor­
related with interest and the very shrewd remark that
if the "statesman were better acquainted with the in­
terest of the trader than the trader himself . . . simple
information would be suffici.ent to produce the effect
without an exercise of power ."7
No conflict between the two types of freedom was at
first expected. In point of fact democracy was expected
5 Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, I, 132.
6 J. S. Mill, "On Bentham," in Dissertations and Discussions, I, 377.
7 W. Stark, Jeremy Bent/lam's Economic Writings, I, 229-31.
(Continued on page 19)
Participating in the morning session on "Freedom in
the Two Market Places" were (left to right) Alexander
Meiklejohn, former president, Amherst College, and for­
mer chairman of the Experimental College of the Uni­
versity of Wisconsin, who spoke on "The Priority of
the Market Place of Ideas"; Wilber C. Katz, James
Parker Hall Professor of Law, who presided; Professor
Director; and Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law, Har­
vard University, whose paper was entitled, "Competing
Freedoms in American Constitutional Law."
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Freedom and the Law
The third of the Fiftieth Anniversary conferences
sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School
was on the theme, "Freedom and the Law" and was
held on Thursday, May 7, 1953. More than two hundred
guests attended the all-day sessions devoted to individ­
ual, social, economic, and political freedom within the
framework of the law.
Alexander Meiklejohn, one of the nation's most distin­
guished educators, opened the morning session with a
strong plea for the preservation of our traditional liber­
ties. "Claims of authority to compel a man to state his
political opinions are subversive of the most fundamen­
tal, principles of the Constitution-the principle of the
political supremacy of the people over their agents,"
Professor Meiklejohn stated.
Loyalty, Meiklejohn pointed out, does not imply con­
formity of opinion. Every elector, in the field of political
thinking, has authority either to approve or to con­
demn (1) any laws enacted by the legislature, (2) any
measures taken by the executive, (3) any decisions ren­
dered by the judiciary, and (4) any principles estab­
lished by the Constitution.
"In the long run, it is never true that the security of
the nation is endangered by, the freedom'of the people.
Whatever may be the immediate gains and losses, the
dangers to security arising from political suppression are
always greater than the dangers to that security arising
from political freedom.
"Repression is always foolish. Freedom is always wise.
That is the faith, the experimental faith, by which
Americans have undertaken to live," Meiklejohn said.
,
Joining with Professor Meiklejohn in the session on
"Freedom in the Two Market Places" was Professor
Paul A. Freund of Harvard University. In his remarks
Mr. Freund suggested that the Supreme Court has been
more successful in meeting the problems of the free
market than it has with those of free expression.
One-half of the speakers' table at the luncheon session
shows (left to right) Aaron Director, Alexander Meikle­
john , Nathaniel L. Nathanson , Justice Vanderbilt, and
Harry Kalven, Jr.
Completing the speakers' table were (left to right) Ben­
jamin V. Cohen '15, Richard C. Donnelly, Kenneth
Culp Davis, Douglas B. Maggs, and Paul A. Freund.
"From the beginning, a free market in goods had to
be harmonized with the claims of the states for taxes
and protection of the local welfare. The reconciliation
of a free market in ideas with the claims of the general
security occupied the Supreme Court very little until
the past generation."
Professor Freund suggested that the government may
make accommodations to the traditional concepts of
freedom but that it must justify these encroachments on
expression by showing that they are not excessive means
to achieve a proper end. Mr. Freund called the Supreme
\
Court's decision in upholding the conviction of the
Communist leaders under the Smith Act "disquieting."
"The decision is disquieting not because it may have
offended against the rules of formal logic nor because
the Communist organizers are particularly worthy of
sympathy. Most of the great victories in the history of
freedom have been won on 'behalf of individuals who
were not endearing.
"What is disquieting is the idea that Congress need
not lay the knife close to the evils which are feared but
may insert it all the way back to the stage of propa­
ganda.
"This is especially troublesome when coupled with
Among the alumni attending the Conference were (left
to right) Chester S. Bell '15, Moses Levitan '13, .and
Judge Samuel B. Epstein '15.
Vol. 2, No.3 The University of Chicago Law School 9
the virtual abandonment of the 'clear and present dan­
ger' test, and the substitution of a test of serious danger
discounted by its unlikelihood.
"Judges and juries thus are given a license to speculate
in historical futures. This is a license which the test of
clear and present danger was to withhold in the market
place of ideas."
Associate Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., presided at the
afternoon session, devoted to the subject, "Restrictions
on Tribunals and the Protection of Freedom." Participat­
ing in the discussion were Richard C. Donnelley, asso­
ciate professor, Yale Law School; Kenneth Culp Davis,
professor of law, University of Minnesota; and Chief
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. Mr. Donnelly spoke on "The Role of the
Rules of Evidence"; Mr. Davis' topic was "The Develop­
ment of the Administrative Agency"; and Justice Van­
derbilt's paper was entitled, "The Role of Procedure in
the Protection of Freedom."
Participating in the discussion as commentators were
Benjamin V. Cohen '15, United States Delegate to the
General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948-52;
Douglas B. Maggs, professor of law, Duke University;
and Nathaniel L. Nathanson, professor of law, North­
western University.
Justice Vanderbilt pointed out that criminal law is
being enforced in an era of rapid communication and
transportation along lines better suited to the horse-and­
buggy age.
"The average citizen cannot be blamed for thinking
what is going on in the traffic courts today may also be
going on at the court house or even the state capital.
"More than 15,400,000 citizens come to the traffic
courts as defendants, and what they see and hear-and
sometimes smell-in these courts does not tend to create
respect for law and for the judges and lawyers adminis­
tering law."
Turning to judicial reform, which he termed "no
sport for the short-winded," Justice Vanderbilt said:
"There is no judicial reform program that could not be
accomplished with dispatch if the governor, the legis­
lative leaders, and the chief justice so desired."
Following dinner at the University's Quadrangle
Club, the evening session of the Conference was de­
voted to "Principal Issues of Economic Freedom." Ros­
coe T. Steffen, John P. Wilson Professor of Law, pre­
sided.
Participating in the discussion were J. M. Clark, pro­
fessor of economics, Columbia University, who gave "A
Statement of Issues"; Thurman Arnold, of Arnold,
Fortas & Porter, Washington, who made "A Reappraisal
of the Antitrust Laws"; David McCord Wright, pro­
fessor of economics, University of Virginia, who spoke
on "Economic Man, Trade-Union Man, Total Man";
and John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics,
Harvard University, who concluded the day's activities
with his paper, "The Nature of Economic Freedom."
At the speakers' table at the evening session are (left to
right) Thurman Arnold, Roscoe T. Steffen, who pre­
sided, and I. M. Clark.
Also at the evening speakers' table were David McCord
Wright (left) and [ohn Kenneth Galbraith.
Earl F. Simmons '35 (left) and P. Newton Todhunter
'37 seen with a group of law students at the dinner
session,
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The Use and Disposition of
Private Property
The second of the three conferences held in 1952-53,
celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Law School,
took place on February 27. Under the general subject,
"The Use and Disposition of Private Property," its
topics ranged from the transmission of wealth in one
generation to the next to the recently developed public
controls on an owner's use of his property.
The Conference Committee was composed of Asso­
ciate Professor Walter J. Blum, Professor Allison Dun­
ham, Associate Professor Harry Kalven, [r., Professor
William R. Ming, Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe,
Professor Max Rheinstein, Professor Malcolm Sharp,
and Professor Roscoe Steffen. The Conference was open
to the general public.
Taking a keynote from the Fiftieth Anniversary cele­
bration, the Conference emphasized the many changes
which have taken place in the rules of property since
October, 1902, when the Law School was founded.
Max Rheinstein, Max Pam Professor of Comparative
Law, presided at the morning session, which was de­
voted to the subject, "The Property Owner and His Fam­
ily." Participating in the panel were Richard W. Effiand,
professor of law, University of Wisconsin, who spoke
on "The Owner's Choice of Succession," and Frank H.
Detweiler '31, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, New
York, whose topic was "The Owner's Control over
Property Use and Disposition after His Death."
The luncheon session, held at the Quadrangle Club,
was on the topic, "The Property Owner and the Public."
Professor Allison Dunham, who presided, extended a
special welcome to Roscoe Pound, Professor and Dean
Left to right: Richard W. Effland, Frank H. Detweiler
'Il, and Professor Max Rheinstein.
Left to right : Walker Cisler, president, Detroit Edison
Company; Roy Blough, director of the Office of
Economic Affairs; Roscoe Pound, Dean and Professor
Emeritus, Harvard Law School; and Professor Allison
Dunham.
.
Emeritus of the Harvard Law School, whose paper was
on "The Changing Role of Property in American Juris­
prudence." In his remarks Dean Pound mentioned that
his visit was somewhat of a home-coming. During
1909-10 he served as a member of the Law School's early
faculty. Joining with Dean Pound and Mr. Dunham
were Roy Blough, director of the Office of Economic
Affairs, the United Nations, who discussed "The Effect
of Tax Laws on the Use and Disposition of Property,"
and Walker Cisler, president, The Detroit Edison Com­
pany, speaking on "Private Property and the Develop­
ment of Atomic Energy."
Professor Sheldon Tefft presided at the afternoon
session on "The Property Owner and Purchasers and
Creditors." The other members of the panel were
Charles G. Grimes, general counsel, Chicago Title and
Trust Company, who spoke on "Rights of Creditors To
Limit the Owner's Disposition and Use of His Prop­
erty," and W. Page Keeton, dean and professor of law,
University of Texas Law School, who discussed "Rights
of Disappointed Purchasers."
Following the reception and dinner, the evening ses­
si.on took place with Associate Professor Walter Blum in
the chair. The topic of the evening discussion was "The
Property Owner and Programs for the Conservation of
Family Estates." Joseph Trachtman of New York spoke
on "The Use of Trusts and Other Family Arrange­
ments," William J. Bowe, professor of law, Vanderbilt
University, presented his views on "The Use of Life
Insurance," and Rene A. Wormser, of Myles, Wormser
and Koch, New York, discussed "Methods of Disposing
of Family Business."
The papers of the Conference have been published
and can be obtained from The Law School Office.
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At the reception preceding dinner (left to right) Walter
Blum, Roscoe Steffen, William Crosshe», and Joseph
Trachtman.
The program is getting a thorough perusal at the speak­
ers' table from (left to right) William J. Bowe, Harry
Kalucn, Jr.7 and Joseph Trachtman,
Antitrust Seminar
From June 15 to June 26, 1953, The Law School held
a resident seminar on Antitrust for members of the bar.
Representatives of many of the nation's major corpora­
tions and law firms attended the meetings on the Uni­
versity. campus.
The leaders of the seminar included Professor M. A.
Adelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; V. w.
Bladen, Director, Institute of Business Administration,
University of Toronto; Ward Bowman, research asso­
ciate, University of Chicago Law School; Professor Yale
Brozen, Northwestern University; Hammond Chaffetz,
Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin and Ellis; Professor
Aaron Director; Professor Ralph Fuchs, Indiana Uni­
versity Law School; Professor Carl H. Fulda, Rutgers
University Law School; Rosemary D. Hale, Lake Forest
College; George E. Hale, Wilson and Mcllvaine; A.
Leslie Hodson, Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin and
Ellis; Professor Willard Hurst, University of Wisconsin
Law School; William Letwin, research associate, Uni­
versity of Chicago Law School; Dean Edward H. Levi;
F. A. McGregor, former combines investigator of Cana­
da; Professor Fritz Machlup, Department of Political
Economy, Johns Hopkins University; Professor William
H. Nicholls, Vanderbilt University; Casper W. Ooms,
Dawson and Ooms; Professor Eugene V. Rostow, Yale
School of Law; Professor Louis B. Schwartz, University
of Pennsylvania Law School; Thomas E. Sunderland,
general counsel, Standard Oil Company (Indiana); and
Robert L. Wright, District of Columbia Bar.
The schedule of discussions was as follows:
HURST: The Historical Setting of the Sherman Act
LETWIN: Early History and Purpose of the Sherman Act
OOMS: Public Policy and the Patent and Trade-Mark Law
MACHLUP: Public Policy and the Patent and Trade-Mark
Law
DIRECTOR: Devices Regarded as Monopolizing
ADELMAN: The Problem of Integration
SCHWARTZ: Competition in the Regulated Industries
G. HALE, R. HALE: Market Imperfections
ROSTOW: Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Law
FUCHS: Critique of the Robinson-Patman Act
CHAFFETZ and SUNDERLAND: The Robinson-Patman Act
NICHOLLS: Problems in the Several Firm Industries
WRIGHT: Doctrines of Conspiracy
FULDA: Resale Price Maintenance
BOWMAN: Resale Price Maintenance
BLADEN and MCGREGOR: Canadian Policy toward Antitrust
ROSTOW: Basic Implications of the Size Theory
BROZEN: Special Problems of the Natural Resources In­
dustries
During last year the Law School began a research
program on the problems of antitrust. Contributors to
the law and economics fund making possible these
studies include Sears, Roebuck and Company, Swift and
Company, Standard Oil Company (Indiana), Borg­
Warner Corporation, International Harvester Company,
and International Minerals and Chemical Company.
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UThe Administration of Criminal Law"
by Ernst W. Puukammcr
This book, although the writer does not agree �ith
everything that Professor Puttkammer states therein, is
an important contribution to the practice of criminal
law. It must be remembered that very few books have
been written on this phase of the law. Criminal law, as
popular as it is in a general sense, has very few texts of
any particular value. This text is an exceptionally useful
book, not only for laymen and law students, but for the
everyday practicing lawyer. Although Professor Putt­
kammer intimates its basic value is to laymen and law
students, the writer feels that it serves an extremely use­
ful purpose for the everyday practicing lawyer.
In a city like Chicago, where the Criminal Court is
remote from the other courts, the criminal practice is
limited to a few. The young lawyer, who today does not
have the advantage the old lawyer had in the days when
the Criminal Court was in close proximity to all lawyers,
can use this much-needed book in the way of "handy"
information. This is also particularly so in cities where
the public defender represents so many people, hence
depriving the young lawyer of the opportunity to occa­
sionally represent one charged with a crime.
Professor Puttkammer, by way of introduction, 'dis­
cusses the purposes of the criminal law from every pos­
sible aspect. Particularly amusing is the analogy of the
criminal who repeats his crime because of a return to the
same environment to that of a person who acquired
pneumonia and was cured, and then returned to the
same atmospheric conditions and then had a recur­
rence-omitting completely that the repeater could, if he
desired, avoid the crime even in the same environment
if he so wished.
His chapter on "Police Organization" is highly in­
formative and gives a short and interesting history of
this organization. It is interesting to note that the
"policeman," as such, is only ofrecent origin and that,
particularly on the Continent, policemen more often
than not come from some other community than the
one in which they are police officers. What a contro­
versy making it a requisite that nonresidence be the
basis of an appointment to the police department would
raise in a city like Chicago or New York.
Professor Puttkammer speaks of crime waves as being
the idea .of a shortage of newspaper material. He serves
a very useful purpose in writing of crime waves in that
light. It enables the practicing attorney, the student, and
the laymen to realize that no crime wave in fact exists in
many cases. He presents an entirely different approach
to the administration of punishment in the courts. Too
freque-ntly, courts are influenced by what newspapers
say rather than by the issues immediately before the
courts. It would be well if the courts would read what
Professor Puttkammer says of crime waves toward assist­
ing them in the administration of justice.
Ernst 111. Puttkammer
He discusses at some length the basis of an arrest
and warrants and a summons. He points out how stat­
utes have limited the authority of a citizen to make an
arrest. His reference to the summons, although over­
looked in the state's courts, as far as criminal matters
are concerned, is interesting enough and particularly so
when one considers that in England 82 per cent of the
offenses were proceeded against by way of summons.
In our states, although used, it is so insignificant that it
would be interesting to conjecture what reaction would
be had if the states were to adopt it on the same basis as
England.
- Professor Puttkammer discusses police investigation
from only two aspects: (1) the questioning of suspects
and abuses and (2) search and seizure. It is difficult to
understand the divergent points of view that Puttkam­
mer takes, in that he so bitterly opposes third-degree
measures but intimates that, as far as search and seizure
are concerned, the rule that ought to prevail is that
civil liability is the only remedy against officials who
engage in an illegal seizure. In either event, it is sug­
gested that the point of view ought to be the same in
both cases, and violations of constitutional rights, in
either event, should be strictly upheld, even though on
an occasion justice might be thwarted. .
The writer agrees with what is said of the police
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magistrate or the presiding magistrate on preliminary
hearings, and what is said therein, if true, would add a
great deal to the administration of criminal law, al­
though, in fact, a court, the presiding magistrate, partic­
ularly in many of our large cities, including Chicago, is
merely a hold-over court without a hearing. How often
does a lawyer complain of the court that makes the
remark that "this is a hold-over court in which the
defendant does not have to be represented by counsel, is
not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, and that the
hearing is limited to only what the court wants to hear
and no more." It might be suggested that it is not often
too frequent that he is by-passed and the matter is heard
directly by the grand jury.
The rights and duties of the coroner are discussed at
some length. It is sufficient to say, as Professor Putt­
kammer intimates, that it is an office of ancient origin
and should have long been abolished. He speaks of the
medical examiner as supplementing the coroner but
under the direct supervision of the state's attorney's
office. There are occasions, however, when a coroner's in­
quest could arouse an indifferent state's attorney to
prosecute when the need should arise.
The reference to the grand jury and its duties por­
trays an interesting insight into that body; although an
independent body, unfortunately at times, its destinies
can be guided by a clever prosecutor.
He comments on the indictment and information, and
this is most noteworthy in that he indulges in discussing
some of the difficulties at some times attached to such in­
struments. His discussion on the elimination of a grand
jury and on proceeding by information is extremely in­
teresting, and the conclusion that he comes to, namely,
the retention of both systems on a limited basis, is inter­
esting to observe.
He discusses jurisdiction and venue, extradition and
rendition, with sufficiency to comprehend the issues in­
volved.
His chapter on arraignment becomes more interesting
today in view of the rule now used in some states requir­
ing a particular transcript of the proceedings to be filed
concerning arraignment to preclude the defendant from
subsequently raising the question that no attorney was
appointed for him, that he did not have the choice of an
attorney, and that he was not fully advised as to his
plea as well as to the charge against him.
Puttkammer's chapter on the trial, particularly as to
the public defender, should be of great interest to law­
yers generally. Unfortunately for the professor, he as­
sumes that, because of the friendship created between
the public defender and the prosecution, a give-and-take
situation would not materialize under such conditions.
This is not necessarily so. The converse is true; a strong
public defender, through these friendships, could pos­
sibly gain an advantage that might not otherwise be
obtained.
Professor Puttkammer also discusses posttrial motions.
Unfortunately, he omits the postconviction statute,
which provides for a remedy for prisoners who main­
tain that their conviction was a result of a substantial
violation of their constitutional rights. It has become
quite a controversial statute, but indications are that the
substance of it will remain.
Professor Puttkammer's book, all in all, is a contribu­
tion to anyone interested in the administration of crimi­
nal justice. It is informative, at spots controversial, but,
on the whole, worth-while reading; and, used as a hand­
book of information, it is invaluable.
FRANK FERLIC '30
Lloyd Elected Trustee
As this issue of the RECORD goes to press, word has been
received that Glen A. Lloyd '23, President of The Law
School Alumni Association, has been elected to the
Board of Trustees of the University of Chicago. Mr.
Lloyd is the sixteenth alumnus member of the Board.
In addition to his busy practice as a senior partner
in the firm of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd, and his
constant and vital activity on behalf of The Law School,
Mr. Lloyd is one of Chicago's most active and public
spirited citizens. He is president of the Board of Lake
Forest Academy and a trustee and member of the ex­
ecutive committee of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic
Studies. He was vice-chairman of the Goethe Bicen­
tennial held i.n Aspen, Colorado, in 1948.
A former vice-president of the Republican Citizens'
Finance Committee of Illinois, he has also served as
secretary of the Commercial Club of Chicago and vice­
president of the Chicago Council of the Boy Scouts
of America.
The busy President of our Law School Alumni Associ­
ation holds a number of corporate directorships, among
them being the Produce Terminal Cold Storage Com­
pany of Chicago, Yates-American Machine Company of
Beloit, Wisconsin, South Bend Lathe Works, and W. F.
and John Barnes Company of Rockford, Illinois.
He is a member of the American, Illinois State, and
Chicago Bar associations and The Law Club and The
Legal Club of Chicago. He is a former member of the
Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Association.
Mr. Lloyd was born in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1895,
the son of Henry Baldwin and Maud Jones Lloyd. He
attended school in the preparatory department of Mary­
ville College and was graduated from Maryville with
the degree of A.B. He also attended Westminster Col­
lege, Salt Lake City, Utah, and was awarded an honorary
LL.D. from Westminster in 1951.
Upon receipt of his J.D. from Chicago, he became asso­
ciated with his present firm-then known as Fisher, Boy­
den, Kales and Bell. He became a partner in 1931, and the
firm name was changed to its present name-Bell, Boyd,
Marshall and Lloyd-in 1949.
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Students Honor Crosskey
Seen (left to right) at the speakers' table at the student
dinner honoring Professor William W. Crosskey are
James Ford '53, Professor Malcolm Sharp, Profess�r
Crosshcy, David Ladd '53, Mrs. Crosskey, Professor Wd­
ber G. Katz, and Alan Rosenblat '53.
More than forty students paid tribute to Professor
William W. Crosskey at a dinner arranged by them at
the Quadrangle Club on May 14, 1953. The specific
occasion for the dinner was the publication of Mr. Cross­
key's already renowned Politics and the Constitution. But
a specific occasion was not needed for the students to
express their affection and esteem for William Crosskey.
Over the years many classes of Law School students
have come out of Constitutional Law confirmed Cross­
keyites.
David Ladd '53, who graduated this quarter and is
now with the firm of Dawson and Ooms, was chairman
of the dinner committee made up of Alan Rosenblat,
George Beall, and Brent Foster. Among the alumni who
sent letters of greeting to Mr. Crosskey on this occasion
were Casper 00111S '27, Laird Bell '07, and George
PIetsch '43.
Joinina with the students in this overflowing expres-b
.
sion of esteem were the faculty speakers of the evel1lng,
Wilber G. Katz, James Parker Hall Professor of Law,
and Professors Malcolm Sharp, Karl Llewellyn, and
Soia Mentschikoff.
Corbin on Crosskey
Professor Crosskey's great work on Politics and the C01l­
stitution should be read by every judge of a high court;
without doubt it will be. In some instances, perhaps, the
first reaction to it will be one of resentment; but more
mature reflection, which is sure to follow, can produce
only the pleasure of enlightenment. Two very impressive
features of the work are its clear and attractive style and
its detailed and convincing historical research; but these
are important chiefly because they give full effect to the
critical thinking of a first-class legal mind that has never
been blunted by its contact with prevailing legalistic
verbiaze and is one that well knows the part that "pol i-b
tics" plays in constitutional interpretation without being
slanted by the political prejudices and emotions of his
own time.
In reading the first chapters, some may get the impres­
sion that the author devotes too much space to the lan­
zuase of the time in which the Constitution was writtenb b
and was first interpreted. The truth is, however, that
this is one of the most valuable features of the book. In
the whole field of law and government there is nothing
more necessary, and nothing more obviously lacking,
than a conscious realization of the uncertainties of lan­
auaae, the variety and changeability in the usages of
words, Lack of such realization is one of the principal
causes of inj ustice, of litigation, and even of war. It has
caused new and harmful interpretations of old statutes
and constitutions by judges and executives who were
ignorant of the nature of language and its growth, as
well as by those who intentionally took advantage of the
prevailina iznorance of others to redistribute politicalb b
and economic power by a sly shift in word meanings.
An Ensrlish judge once said of the Statute of Frauds,b b
an important instrument now 275 years old and the
subject of continual litigation: "It is now two centuries
too late to ascertain [its] meaning by applying one's
own mind independently to the interpretation of its
language. Our task is a much more humble one; it is to
see how that [statute] has been expounded in decisions
and how the decisions apply to the present case." A com­
parative study of the many thousands of such decisions,
constantly increasing in number, shows that a desire to
be "humble" may lead merely to the distraction of
judges and to the frustration of justice. Humility should
go hand in hand with experience and intelligence. It is
time to make a new start with the exact words of the
statute.
This is just what Professor Crosskey does with the
Constitution of the United States, a document of vast
importance to millions, now 164 years old, the applica­
tion of which is in constant litigation. If, as his evidence
indicates, the power of Congress "to regulate Commerce
among the several States" has been grossly pared down,
resulting in a no-man's land and in endless "jurisdic­
tional" litigation; if the prohibition that "No state shall
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports" has
been likewise cut down, opening the door toward the
destruction of our freedom of commerce among the
states· if these and other similar variations have occurred
with .resultina harm to our welfare and interest, bothb
national and individual; if these variations have
occurred, not merely because the Court has been aware
(Continued on t-s« 19)
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Left to right: Fred J.' O'Connor '28 and C. Thomas
Hanley '23 compared views on the Conference on "Free­
dom and the Law."
Lowell Wadmond Cited
At the Annual Alumni Assembly this year the Uni­
versity of Chicago Alumni Association presented a
citation for public service to Lowell C. Wadmond '22,
J.D. '24. Mr. Wadrnond, a member of the firm of White
and Case in New York, has for twenty years served on
the Committee on Character and Fitness of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York. He is
chairman of the Board of Governors of The Lawyer's
Club of New York and has a distinguished record of
leadership in civic, philanthropic, and professional en­
deavors. He is president of the Metropolitan Opera
Association, presiding elder of the Brick Presbyterian
Church, and holds the Order of the North Star from
King Gustav V of Sweden.
The Alumni Association inaugurated its citation pro­
gram in 1941 to recognize the achievements �f its alum­
ni. Thus far 350 alumni have been cited. In the past
citations have been awarded only to alumni of the Col­
lege. Beginning in 1954, alumni at all degree levels will
be eligible for the awards. You can help the Association
discover candidates for the awards by sending their
names with pertinent data and references to the Alumni
Association.
Summer Quarter 1953 . June 22 to August 29
PROGRAM OF COURSES
202. CONTRACTS. MALCOLM P. SHARP, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 8:00-9:00 and 11:00-
12:00 M-TH; Law South
204. CIVIL PROCEDURE. BRAINERD CURRIE, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 10:00 M-TH;
Law North
302b. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. W. W. CROSSKEY, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 2:00
M-F; Law South
304. ACCOUNTING. WILBER G. KATZ, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
8:00 TU-F; Law North
309. TRIAL PRACTICE. PHILIP KURLAND, Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 10:00
M-TH; Court
329. RESTITUTION. EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Professor of
Law, University of California School of Law, Berkeley. 9:00 M-TH; Law North
404. LABOR LAW. J. KEITH MANN, Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School, Professor of Law, Stan­
ford University Law School. 9:00 M-TH; Law South
412. INSURANCE. WALTER BLUM, Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, and WILBER G.
KATZ, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 11 :00 TU-F; Court
415. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Jo DESHA LUCAs, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School. 8:00 TU-F; Court
491. SEMINAR ON PROBLEMS IN ANTITRUST LAWS AND LAWS RELATING TO UNFAIR COMPE­
TITION. EDWARD H. LEVI, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 3:00-5:00 TU, TH;
Court
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Life in Beecher
Since its opening last fall as The L�w School residence,
Beecher Hall has become an important and busy center
of activity for all law students. Numerous special meet­
ings and social events have been held at the Hall, and,
in addition to its residence functions, it provides facili­
ties for entertaining Law School visitors. During the
first year Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Dean Roscoe
Pound stayed in the Beecher guest suite during their
visits to The Law School.
Beecher Hall
A softball team and a basketball team have been or­
ganized among the residents, and the Beecher Nine won
the campus independent softball championship.
Two regular events held in the Hall have been the
Friday evening meetings and the seminar luncheons
with visiting members of the bench and bar. These occa­
sions give the law students an opportunity to discuss a
variety of problems with practicing lawyers, judges, and
legal scholars from other institutions. Among the Friday
evening visitors this winter and spring were:
RICHARD F. BABCOCK '46, Taylor, Miller, Busch & Magner
ABNER MIKVA '51, Goldberg, Devoe, Brussel & Shadur
LUIS KUTNER
STANTON E. HYER '25, Hyer, Gill & Brown
QUINCY \\'RIGHT, Professor of Political Science
LAIRD BELL '07, Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd
JOSEPH LOHMAN, Lecturer in Sociology
RICHARD B. AUSTIN '26, Assistant State's Attorney
JOHN M. HARLAN, Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby &
Palmer
MORRIS I. LEIBMAN '33, Crowell & Leibman
JOSEPH McMAHON, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Among the seminar leaders at the student luncheons
have been:
WALKER B. DAVIS '27, Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
JEROME S. KATZIN '41, Director of Public Utilities, Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission
EDWARD H. HARSHA '40
HONORABLE WALTER V. SCHAEFER '28, Chief Justice, Illi­
nois Supreme Court
H. TEMPLETON BROWN, Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt
ROBERT REDFIELD, Robert M. Hutchins Distinguished
Service Professor of Anthropology, University of Chi­
cago
CHARLES BANE, Mitchell, Conway & Bane
Federal Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., addressed The
Law School last October, and following this meeting a
reception was held in his honor in Beecher Hall. Left
to right: Wilhelm Oberer, Germany, Alan Edwards,
Chicago, Judge Wyzanski, and Ruth Miner, Vermont,
Illinois.
Dean Pound stayed in the guest suite at Beecher Hall
during his visit to The Law School. He is shown here
with Professor Sheldon Tefft and a group of the stu­
dents after lunch.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter also stayed at Beecher Hall dur­
ing his two-day visit to The Law School this winter. He
met with a number of groups of students and is shown
here at lunch with the Beecher residents and members
of the faculty.
Among the Friday evening visitors has been Joseph D.
Lohman, lecturer in sociology and law and former chair­
man of the State of Illinois Parole Board. Mrs. Sheldon
Tefft is seated with Mr. Lohman and the students.
Mr. and Mrs. John M. Harlan visited Beecher Hall dur­
ing the Spring Quarter and had dinner with the resi­
dents. Mr. Harlan, of Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby
& Palmer, was in Chicago as Chief Counsel for the Du­
Pont Corporation. Following dinner he met informally
with the students.
Milk time is an important hour in the Beecher Hall
routine; afternoon tea and evening coffee are also avail­
able to all law students.
The Beecher Nine with a few extras thrown in
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"It is the virtue of case-law reasoning that it achieves
continuity with the past, that it shapes the law with due
regard for the ideals and judgments of the community,
and that, while changing the law, it achieves a measure
of consistency essential if human expectations are to be
fulfilled."
Dean Levi then discussed the development of the rule
of negligence in crossing and roadway cases in England
and the United States and reviewed the pattern in Ore­
gon as disclosed by cited cases of the Oregon Supreme
Court, going back to the middle 1880's.
"Law-making systems must meet the standards of con­
tinuity and practicality," he concluded. "The distinctions
and ideas on which rules are based must be understand­
able and natural to the community. The problem of law­
making is not to make new laws for perfect people;
rather it is to work with and benefit people as they are.
"Continuity with the future is just as important as
continuity with the past. It is respect for the expectations
of people which distinguishes the rule of law from the
caprice/of arbitrary discretion. These requirements are
j ust ,�s applicable to legislation as they are to judge-madelaw.
The luncheon for Dean and Mrs. Levi with the Chi­
cago Alumni Club in Portland was presided over by
Robert L. Weiss '48. While in Seattle, where the Dean
spoke before the Bar Association, the Levis also' met at
lunch with the Seattle Chicago Alumni Club.
Oregon Associate Supreme Court Justice George Ross­
man '10 introduced Dean Levi at the Portland bar meet­
ing and gave a luncheon in his home for the Levis and
the members of the Oregon Supreme Court.
Dean and Mrs. Levi at lunch with the Portland Chicago Alumni Club
Dean Levi Visits Oregon Alumni
Invitations to address the Seattle Bar Association and
the joint meeting of the Oregon State Bar Association
and the Multnomah Bar gave Dean and Mrs. Edward
H. Levi the opportunity to visit in March with alumni
in Seattle and Portland.
"A Jurisprudence for the Legal Profession" was the
subject of the Dean's talk before more than two hundred
lawyers meeting in Portland.
"Jurisprudence is the description and appraisal of the
art of law," Dean Levi said, "but, to the Anglo-Ameri­
can lawyer, jurisprudence for the most part appears to
deal with what Professor Dicey has called 'the oddities
of the outlying portions of legal science.' This is not
wholly true, for in this country on great issues we be­
come insistent upon our jurisprudence.
"The concepts of sovereignty, the state, the separation
of powers, justice and natural rights are then used to ex­
plain positions. The contribution of jurisprudence to
great issues is most inadequate if the science has not kept
in touch with the workings of the legal system.
"As lawyers we deal with situati.ons and cases. This is
the material from which our law grows. The creation of
law out of lawsuits is the essential characteristic of our
system of law. Our law, more than any other highly de­
veloped legal system, depends upon case reasoning for
its development.
"There is no better way to see general truths like these
than to watch them at work on homely simple matters
of the everyday. The law of negligence as applied to
. railroad-crossing acci.dents is an example.
Vol. 2, No.3 The University of Chicago Law School 19
Corbin on Crosskey (Continued [rom page 14)
of "election returns" but because of ignorance of
changes in the usages of words and because of the pres­
sures of political ambitions and sectional interests, it is
time for us to be made conscious of the facts and to read
anew the exact words of the Constitutlo� in the light of
that awareness.
The author undoubtedly hopes that his work will have
important effects upon the interpretation of language
and in the reversing of trends in court decisions. In a
respectable degree, at least, his hopes should be well
founded. He knows well enough, however, that igno­
rance is both massive and self-perpetuating and that de­
cisions may not in a month undo what the decisions of a
hundred years have done. The present turmoils show
well enough that political ambitions and sectional inter­
ests still determine executive, legislative, and judicial
action. The extent to which Professor Crosskey's work
will, or should, result in a changed trend or in the over­
ruling of former decisions will depend upon wisdom as
well as upon humility; and wisdom, while in large
measure dependent upon humility, is generally quite
impotent without courage. This is a wise and courageous
book and cannot fail to strengthen the minds and arms
of honest and intelligent men.
ARTHUR L. CORBI�
The EconomicMarket Place (Continued [rom page 7)
to reinforce the other type of freedom. Any English­
man at the end of the eighteenth century who, says
Leslie Stephen, the historian of utilitarianism, demand­
ed more power for the people "always took for granted
their power would be used to diminish the activity of
the sovereign power; that there would be less govern­
ment and therefore less jobbery, less interference with
free speech and free action, and smaller perquisites to be
bestowed in return for the necessary services. The peo­
ple would use their authority to tie the hands of the
rulers, and limit them strictly to their proper and nar­
row functions.?"
No conflict between the two types of freedom did,
in fact, arise for a considerable period of time, and,
when John Stuart Mill wrote the celebrated essay On
Liberty, it was not to encroachment on individual lib­
erty through legislation that he directed his eloquence
but to the tyranny of public opinion. This was also
the main theme of Tocqueville's famous book which
significantly strengthened Mill's own views on the dan­
gers of democracy,"
The subsequent decline of the attachment to individ­
ualism as dogma and the gradual replacement of free­
dom in economic affairs by collectivist (i.e., political)
8 Op. cit., p. 132.
9 Cf. Mill's review on Democracy in America (Dissertations and
Discussions, II, 1-83).
forms of organization were admirably traced by Dicey
first at the end of the century and again in 1914.10 The
further extension of collectivism in our time substan­
tially enhances the reputation of Dicey as a prophet.
Putting to one side that part of intellectual opinion
which has repudiated the attachment both to civil lib­
erty and to economic freedom, we note the marked
divergence between the attachment to liberty as par­
ticipation in government and the repudiation of liberty
as freedom from restraint through government direction
of economic life. In the former I include the attachment
to free speech, the only area where laissez faire is still
respectable.
Bearing in mind the danger of generalization without
empirical investigation, it may nevertheless be asserted
with some confidence that among intellectuals there is
an inverse correlation between the appreciation of the
merits of civil liberty-including freedom of speech­
and the merits of economic freedom. I believe this gen­
eralization will hold even after the exclusion from the
evidence of that group whose attachment to civil lib­
erty is limited to the transition from the capitalist hell
to the authoritarian heaven. Lacking empirical data for
this generalization, I must resort to intellectual pride
as partial proof. Dissent from the generalization implies
either that intellectual discussion is without influence
in the formation of policy or that intellectual opinion
is always two generations behind the times.
Some evidence is readily available. Justice Douglas
has told us:
Free speech, free press, free exercize of religion are placed
separate and apart; they are above and beyond the police
powers; they are not subject to regulation in the manner of
factories, slums, apartment houses, production of oil and
the like.l '
,
And Justice Black tells us with eloquent brevity that,
when it comes to the fixation of prices of natural gas
which goes into interstate commerce, "the alleged fed­
eral constitutional questions are frivolous.t'P I am aware
that the preferred position accorded to free trade in
ideas is based on constitutional considerations, with
which I am not concerned. But I believe that the
preference goes beyond such considerations. Justice
Black tells us not only that "my own belief is that no
legislature is charged with the duty or vested with the
power to decide what public issues Americans can dis­
cuss." He tells us at the same time that "in a free coun­
try that is the individual's choice not the state's.Y'" Our
distinguished visitor tells us not only that the Consti­
tution draws a distinction between the liberty of own­
ing property and freedom of discussion; he warns us
also that, by confusing the two, "we are in constant
10 A. V. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England (2d ed., 1914).
11 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.s. 250 at 286.
12 Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 at 189.
13 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.s. 250 at 270.
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danger of giving to a man's possessions the same dig­
nity, the same status, as we give to the man himself.t""
I hold that this dichotomy is a doubtful one, and I turn
to this aspect of the problem.
III
A superficial explanation for the preference for free
speech among intellectuals runs in terms of vested in­
terests. Everyone tends to magnify the importance of
his own occupation and to minimize that of his neigh­
bor. Intellectuals are engaged in the pursuit of truth,
while others are merely engaged in earning a livelihood.
One follows a profession, usually a learned one, while
the other follows a trade or a business. To cite a trifling
example: For every opinion voiced in England against
restriction of ordinary imports, there must be a hun­
dred against restriction on foreign travel. Objective eval­
uation of the two restrictions would recognize that they
differ only in that one involves bringing the goods to
the consumer, while the other involves shipping the
consumer to the goods. Intellectuals, on the other hand,
see one restriction as interference with culture and the
other as mere exclusion of cheap American movies.
Such an attitude does not accord with a proper re­
spect for the ordinary activities of the bulk of man­
kind. Short of a revolution in tastes which would make
people want much less than they now have of material
well-being, or a revolution in technology while keep­
ing present material wants constant, neither of which
can be expected, most men will for the foreseeable future
have to devote a considerable fraction of their active life
to economic activity. For these people freedom of choice
as owners of resources in choosing, within available and
continually changing opportuni.ties, areas of employment,
investment, and consumption is fully as important as
freedom of discussion and participation in government.
The former freedom is at least important for those who
wish to exercise such freedom.
It is perhaps of such people and of such activities that
Tocqueville wrote:
The principle of enlightened self-interest is not a lofty
one, but it is clear and sure. It:' does not aim at mighty ob­
jects, but it attains without impractical efforts, all those at
which it aims. As it lies within the reach of all capacities,
everyone can without difficulty apprehend and retain it....
The doctrine of enlightened self-interest produces no great
acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self­
denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a virtuous man, but
it disciplines a multitude of citizens in habits of regularity,
temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command: and if it
does not at once lead men to virtue by their will, it draws
them gradually in that direction by their habits.l"
The preference for the free market in ideas stems also
from an undue emphasis on the definition of democ-
14 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-gov­
ernment, p. 2.
15 Democracy in America, II, 122-23.
The wrecking crews are at work on the University of
Chicago campus preparing the ground for the new home
of the American Bar Association.
racy as government by discussion or consensus and
neglect of the older description of democracy as gov­
ernment by majority rule. We have no better alterna­
tive for making political decisions. But decisions are
made by consensus in the sense that all participated in
making them, and those who do not like the decisions
are willing to accept them because of their initial prefer­
ence for this method of making them. This does not
alter the coercive character of government. "The min­
ority gives way not because it is convinced that it is
wrong, but because it is convinced that it is a min­
ority."?" The consent in question is only moderately
different from Hume's conception of consent which
obtains under all forms of government. And this sug­
gests the wisdom of the older persuasion that coercion
is increased as the area of political decision is enlarged.
It is only under a system of voluntary exchange that
freedom is meaningful. It is then possible to choose
between alternative voluntary association. The choice
which one has in moving from one coercive authority
to another is very limited in any event and is further
narrowed as economic affairs are increasingly converted
into political discussion and decision. It is surely no
accident that mobility of people between states was
greater when there was a more complete division of
labor between political and economic institutions. The
choice for members of a minority which does not con­
sent to socialist institutions, even assuming that other
socialist societies will accept them, is that of departing
with bare feet. And such restriction is described as
regulation of possessions or p�operty rather than of men.
The priority accorded to the free market for ideas
as against the free market for economic affairs is de­
rived also from an undue importance attached to dis­
cussion as a method of solving problems. In conse­
quence there is inadequate appreciation of the substan­
tial merits of the impersonal character of the market
when it is competitive. The election is sufficiently re­
cent to make superfluous an elaborate statement of the
foolishness which passes for discussion when specific
16 J. F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, p. 28.
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and important issues of policy such as trade between
nations, fixing rents of houses, or subsidies to agricul­
ture are made the subject of collective decision. Skepti­
cism regarding the possibilities of solving problems by
political decisions after discussion is not confined to
those with a bias for the advantages of the impersonal
market. It is in fact shared by those who wish to maxi­
mize the area of such decisions. This must be the ex­
planation for the results of the recent election which
runs in terms of the effectiveness of advertising and
radio and television entertainment against the party
which "talked sense to the American people." Professor
Cooley, a not unsympathetic student of democratic in­
stitutions, has emphasized the great amount of "non­
sense" which passed for discussion when such issues
as the silver question were made the subject of political
decisions. And he finds the saving feature of democracy
in the skill of the ordinary man in choosing between
persons.!" This in turn emphasizes the large element
of discretionary authority inherent in increasing the
scope of political authority over economic organization.
Finally, Professor Knight, who has explored the lim­
itations of the impersonal voluntary exchange system
of organization with greater subtlety than any critic of
that system, has in turn warned us of the limitations of
discussion:
Genuine, purely intellectual discussion is rare in modern
society, even in intellectual and academic circles, and is ap­
proxirnated only in very small and essentially casual groups.
On the larger scale, what passes for discussion is mostly
argumentation or debate. The intellectual interest is largely
subordinate to entertainment, i.e. entertaining and being en­
tertained, or the immediate interest of the active parties
centers chiefly in dominance, victory, instructing others, or
persuading rather than convincing, and not in the impartial
quest of truth_18
The traditional defense of the free market as a method
of organizing economic life has been utilitarian or in­
strumental. This emphasizes the consequent efficiency
with which resources are used to achieve given ends.
It derives its emphasis from the economist's desire to
be scientific. The traditional defense of the free market
in ideas has in the main also been utilitarian. Thus it
plays an important role in Mill's defense of freedom of
discussion. It has been challenged in both areas and
more extensively in the sphere of economic matters.
An empirical test of efficiency in the absence of experi­
ment with alternative forms of organization is not
readily available. The historical evidence is stronger-at
any rate, less ambiguous-in the economic area. The
short period of liberalism has been accompanied by
as much material progress as took place in all prior
times. But the evidence has not been persuasive. It is
always easy to contrast the observed deficiencies with
Ii C. H. Cooley, Social Organization, pp. 142-43.
18 F. H. Knight, Freedom and Reform, p. 349.
the unknown advantages. And cognizance of deficien­
cies tends-rightly-to grow with material progress.
Very recent experience with alternative forms of organi­
zation has again strengthened the efficiency argument.
This is all to the good: "The common man or average
family has a far greater stake in the size of our aggre­
gate income than in any possible redistribution of in­
come."!" Current concern over the effect of taxation
on incentives also illustrates the revived interest in
efficiency. But I have tried to emphasize the impor­
tance of the free market as an end in itself, as an im­
portant aspect of freedom to choose between alterna­
tives. While not always explicit, I believe it has always
been implicit in the attachment of the great economists
to the liberal tradition. In this context freedom means
more than discussion and participation in government.
It means responsibility, change, adventure, departure
from accepted ways of doing things. It means freedom
to choose one's ends as well as means for attaining them.
In Leslie Stephen's phrase, it means "energy, self-re­
liance, and independence, a strong conviction that a
man's fate should depend upon his own character and
conduct.T" It is broader than Milton's dictum: "The
whole freedom of man consists either in spiritual or
civil liberty."
More recently with the spread of authoritarian re­
gimes which have destroyed both economic and in­
tellectual freedom, the instrumental character of the
free economic market in an entirely new context has
received substantial recognition. This is the argument
that noneconomic freedom cannot flourish when the
division of labor between voluntary organization and
the coercive state is destroyed. Again the argument is
not altogether new. Mill, whose defense of the free
market was mainly in terms of efficiency, nevertheless
added that if the "industries, the universities and the
public charities, were all of them branches of the gov­
ernment; ... if the employees of all these different
enterprises were appointed and paid by the government,
and looked to the government for every rise in life;
not all the freedom of the press and popular constitu­
tion of the legislature would make this or any other
country free otherwise than in name."21
In this respect the political economists have shown
better insight into the basis of all freedom than the pro­
ponents of the priority of the market place for ideas.
The latter must of necessity rely on exhortation and on
the fragile support of self-denying ordinances in consti­
tutions. The former, on the other hand, have grasped
the significance of institutional arrangement which fos­
ter centers of resistance against the encroaching power
of coercive organization. Failure to appreciate this essen­
tial method of protection of freedom among students of
the law who minimize the importance of the free eco-
19 Henry Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, pp. 5-6.
20 Op. cit., p. 131.
21 On Liberty.
22 The Law School Record Vol. 2, No.3
nomic market is especially striking. In their own field
they fully recognize the great significance of legal insti­
tutions-procedure-as against the substantive content
of law in protecting the liberty of the subject.
The issue is no longer one of the general theory of the
essential character of major economic decisions made by
political organizations, which involves broad delegation
of power to experts who cannot be disciplined by those
for whom they act. As individual freedom is being
challenged because we are no longer indifferent to diver­
sity of views, we get an indic�tion of what may happen
when the state becomes the principal employer or deter­
mines the conditions of employment. The privilege
against self-incrimination may not be an important pro­
tection of freedom. But any legal protection of this gen­
eral type will become an empty piece of ceremonial
apparatus when its exercise and protection is accompa­
nied by the loss of one's livelihood. This may increase
our esteem for martyrdom, but martyrs are not always
rewarded in this world.
We can learn much in this context from the acute ob­
servations of a recent comprehensive review of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Without access to
books and records, we are told: "The enforcement of
complicated regulation would break down and would
involve additional costs not easily met in a period when
the government is assuming staggering commitments.
It is not surprising that a majority of the Supreme Court
was convinced that the application of the privilege to re­
quired records is a luxury which a welfare-state cannot
afford."22 Economists cannot distinguish between lux­
uries and necessities; other necessities may become mere
luxuries which the welfare state cannot afford. Courts
cannot provide satisfactory alternative areas of employ­
ment and promotion.
It is not essential to demonstrate that there is only one
road to serfdom or that a particular road must inevitably
lead to a specified destination. Some institutions are
more flexible than others. We must choose those which
minimize the risks of undesirable consequences.
The Law School Entertains
The University of Chicago Law School was host at a
cocktail party on Thursday, June 11, to all the delegates
attending the annual meeting of the Illinois State Bar
Association. More than two hundred lawyers from all
over the state attended the party at the Hotel Orlando.
The occasion marked the conclusion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary celebration of the School. Representing The
Law School at the annual meeting were Dean Edward
H. Levi, Bernard Meltzer, Sheldon Tefft, Karl Llewel­
lyn, Soia Mentschikoff, and James M. Ratcliffe.
22 Bernard D. Meltzer, "Required Records, the McCarran Act, and
the Privilege against Self-incrimination," 18 University of Chicago
Lato Review 728 (1951).
While in Chicago tor the Fiftieth Anniversary Con­
vocation, Joseph W. Bingham '04, who addressed the Con­
vocation Banquet, met many at the present generation
at law students. He is shown here with three June grad­
uates (left to right): lean Allard, Ruth Miner, and
George Beall.
At the Conference on "Freedom and the Law" Alex­
ander Meiklejohn and his son, University of Chi­
cago College Associate Professor Donald Meiklejohn,
greet students, while onlooker Professor Malcolm P.
Sharp seems pleased.
The Faculty 01 The University of Chicago Law School on Convocation Day. Absent from the photograph are Philip Kurland, Malcolm Sharp, Kenneth G.
Sears, Max Rheinstein, who is lecturing in Germany, and Allison Dunham, who is teaching law this quarter at the University of New Zealand.
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